Abstract Reducing computational cost of cryptographic computations for resource-constrained devices is an active research area. One of the practical solutions is to securely outsource the computations to an external and more powerful cloud server. Modular exponentiations are the most expensive computation from the cryptographic point of view. Therefore, outsourcing modular exponentiations to a single, external and potentially untrusted cloud server while ensuring the security and privacy provides an efficient solution. In this paper, we propose new efficient outsourcing algorithms for modular exponentiations using only one untrusted cloud server. These algorithms cover public-base and privateexponent, private-base and public-exponent, private-base and private-exponent, more generally private-base and privateexponents simultaneous modular exponentiations. Our algorithms are the most efficient solutions utilizing only one single untrusted server with the best checkability probabilities. Furthermore, unlike existing schemes, which have fixed checkability probability, our algorithms provide adjustable predetermined checkability parameters. Finally, we apply our algorithms to outsource oblivious transfer protocols and blind signatures which are expensive primitives in modern cryptography.
Introduction
Cloud computing is getting more and more attention in the scientific community due to its multiple benefits for realworld applications (e.g., on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network access, location-independent resource pooling, pay per use, rapid elasticity and outsourcing). Depending on demands, capabilities and resources, it is possible to efficiently outsource costly calculations to more powerful servers using cloud computing infrastructures.
Cryptographic key sizes have been steadily increasing due to mathematical and technological developments. This may lead to that existing resource-constrained devices may become incapable of assuring the desired level of security. In general, these devices are required to be replaced with more powerful new ones. However, this leads to highly impractical and costly solutions. The main motivation of outsourcing computation is to give a usable, secure, and more practical solution. For example, modular exponentiation of the form u a modulo a prime number p, where u, a and p have minimum length of 2048 bits (in order to have a cryptographically secure algorithm), has a big computational obstacle for the computationally limited devices. To compute a single modular exponentiation for 2048-bits exponent a, more than 3000 modular multiplications must be performed in average (using square-and-multiply method). Therefore, it is usable to outsource the expensive computations to the cloud providers. Nevertheless, the outsourced computations may contain additional sensitive information that should not be leaked to the outsiders (e.g., personal, health, or financial data). In order to prevent information leakage, the sensitive data have to be appropriately masked before outsourcing. On the one hand, the masking technique should be designed in such a way that the overall computational cost to the client is significantly reduced. Namely, reducing the cost of masking before outsourcing and the cost of removing the mask after obtaining the result from the cloud provider are of utmost important, and the total cost should be less than performing the computation on the device itself. On the other hand, it is also essential to assure the client that the returned results are indeed correct. Namely, malicious servers or environmental attacks should not compromise the correctness without being detected with a nonnegligible probability. Therefore, it is crucial to have an efficient outsourcing algorithm satisfying certain privacy-preserving properties. This can be achieved by checking and verifying the correctness of the outcome.
One straightforward solution is to assume the existence of a fully trusted or a semi-trusted cloud server. However, because of security and privacy concerns, it is not that likely the case in real-life scenarios. For example, due to financial reasons, malicious cloud providers can insert a software bug that will fail after some particular steps of the algorithms and then return an incorrect result which is computationally indistinguishable from the correct output. By the checkability property, the client can easily detect these malicious behaviors from the cloud side. The main question can be stated as follows:
How can security and privacy be guaranteed by using only a single untrusted server without revealing any information about the inputs and/or the outputs while assuring the correctness?
Related work
Outsourcing secure computation allows parties to compute a functionality without leaking any information about their inputs and/or outputs. In general, it is expected to have no interactions between the parties, and computational cost and bandwidth of each user are expected to be independent of the functionality. However, general program obfuscation is impossible by utilizing only one cloud server [1] . This is one of the reasons that we mainly focus on expensive modular computations.
Many algorithms have been proposed for outsourcing computation [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . They aim either to have a better outsourcing security model or to have more efficient constructions. However, these algorithms consider outsourcing of a public-base and private-exponent, or private-base and public-exponent, or they satisfy weaker security notions. For example, in [17] , Clarke et al. propose protocols for speeding up exponentiation in a cyclic group using untrusted servers for public-base and private-exponent and private-base and public-exponent. They also extend these algorithms to compute an exponentiation modulo a composite integer.
Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [3] presented the first outsource-secure algorithm for modular exponentiations for outsourcing cryptographic computations. This algorithm considers only the case private-base and private-exponent exponentiation modulo a prime number. With this algorithm, modular exponentiations can be computed by the client with O(log 2 (l)) multiplications with error probability 1 2 , where l denotes the number of bits of the exponent. The main drawback of this solution is to use two noncolluding untrusted servers.
At ESORICS 2012, Chen et al. [2] propose a more efficient construction than Hohenberger-Lysyanskaya's algorithm, where the probability of detecting malicious behavior is improved to 2/3. However, modular exponentiations can be computed by the client with O(log 2 (l)) multiplications. They also propose the first secure outsourcing algorithm for simultaneous modular exponentiations u a 1 1 · u a 2 2 . Simultaneous modular exponentiations are also used in many cryptographic primitives such as commitments [18] , zeroknowledge proofs [19] and additive variant of ElGamal encryptions [20] . Chen et al. apply their algorithms to outsource Cramer-Shoup encryptions and Schnorr signatures securely.
The authors in [21] proposed an algorithm using a single untrusted server for public-base and private-exponent and private-base and public-exponent cases. The algorithm is quite interesting since the privacy is guaranteed by the difficulty of solving the subset sum problem. Briefly, the client first randomizes the exponents and then puts a private pattern to the exponent values before they are sent to the server. After the server sends the computed values back to the client, it can verify the correctness efficiently using the pattern. However, there is a checkability issue in their algorithm, where an untrusted server can easily manipulate the result. In particular, the client invokes the server Exp(a, g) to outsource the computation of g a , and instead of Exp(a, g) the malicious server can compute Exp(a, gh) for some bogus value h without being detected. The checks will pass successfully, and subsequently the result would become incorrect without being unnoticed.
The authors in [22] proposed the only existing algorithm for modular exponentiations modulo composite numbers. However, we also address an issue here that the checkability property of their scheme fails. By using their notation, the attack can be explained briefly as follows: A malicious server S uses the proposed values = 1 = 2 = 5 in [22] (or any other case for which = 1 = 2 holds), adds 1 to the values y j , and outputs x y j +1 i instead of x y j i . This enables the server to manipulate the result u a with u a+ without being detected by the client.
Another area of outsourcing computation is the use of homomorphic encryption techniques. Homomorphic encryption allows parties for processing computations on encrypted data without using any additional information like Yao's garbled circuits [23] . Conventional homomorphic encryp-tion schemes are either additive or multiplicative (e.g., RSA is multiplicative, Paillier and modified version of ElGamal encryption are additive [20, 24] , or the 2DNF protocol [25] which allows multiple additions up to only one exponentiation). These schemes allow to outsource-secure function evaluation to a cloud server. Recent somewhat homomorphic and fully homomorphic schemes give a complete solution to the outsourcing problem [26] . However, these systems are not yet efficient enough to be applied in real-life scenarios.
Our contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We propose new, efficient and secure outsourcing algorithms of modular exponentiations using only one untrusted server. We consider the cases public-base and private-exponent, private-base and public-exponent, private-base and private-exponent and simultaneous modular exponentiations separately. This approach realizes privacy-preserving and efficient outsourcing mechanisms, which are highly desirable and often inevitable for resource-constrained devices. Instead of having an adversary model, where distrustful servers are assumed not to collude, our algorithms borrow computing power from only a single untrusted cloud server. This constitutes a more realistic scenario when compared to the state-ofthe-art algorithms in [2] [3] [4] . 2. Our algorithms cover both modulo prime and modulo composite number cases. To the best of our knowledge, these algorithms make for the first time no distinction between prime and composite modulus by a unified modular exponentiation approach. Therefore, modular exponentiations in cryptographic protocols based on both the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the RSA problem can be outsourced securely to an untrusted server. 3. In [5] , the authors propose the first generic algorithm for a single untrusted server considering private-base and private-exponent. Furthermore, it has fixed 1/2 checkability probability. However, their scheme is quite inefficient since it requires approximately 2000 modular multiplications. In contrast to this scheme, we would like to highlight that our private-base and private-exponent algorithm Alg pr pr is the most efficient and verifiable solution with respect to the existing ones (e.g., we have ≈ 10, 17 times less MMs than the only existing algorithm [5] ). 4. We emphasize further that although the existing solutions use two noncolluding malicious servers, they propose only 1/2, 2/3 or 3/4 probabilities for the checkability [2] [3] [4] , respectively. Unlike all existing schemes, our algorithms have not only the best but also more importantly adjustable checkability. Also, any adversarial behavior can be detected by the client with the probability 1
, where c is a small integer used as a security parameter for checkability (e.g., for c = 4 and c = 8 we have 11/12 and 55/56, respectively). 5. Our algorithm for the case of simultaneous modular exponentiation is more efficient than the existing algorithms [2] and [5] (there is only a generalized result in [22] , for which the checkability fails as explained above). The algorithm proposed in [2] only considers two simultaneous modular exponentiations. We generalize this by introducing the notion of t-simultaneous modular exponentiation, i.e., t modular exponentiations can be computed simultaneously in a single round. We also show that we gain linear complexity advantage in t for both the number of modular multiplications and modular inversions. 6. Lastly, we apply the proposed algorithms to outsource oblivious transfer (OT) and blind signature schemes securely. Note that OT is a powerful cryptographic primitive which is "complete" for secure multiparty computation [27, 28] . It is also one of the major computational overheads for Yao's garbled circuit protocols [23, 29] .
OTs are also used in many applications like biometric authentication, e-auctions, private information retrieval and private search [30] [31] [32] [33] . Hence, the overall complexity for mobile environment and resource-constrained devices can be enhanced by outsourcing OT securely. Furthermore, blind signatures [34] are unforgeable and can be verified by a public key like in conventional digital signatures. These signatures can be used in many applications like e-cash, e-voting and anonymous credentials [35] . Hence, outsourcing blind signatures can also be very beneficial for real-life applications.
Roadmap
In Sect. 2, we give our formal security and privacy model based on the model of [3] by simplifying their two untrusted server model to a more realistic and secure one single untrusted server model. Section 3 starts with basic mathematical background of outsourcing algorithms of modular exponentiation and describes the main algorithm for privatebase and private-exponent modular exponentiations. We also provide the proofs of correctness, security and checkability of our algorithms using security/privacy model in Sect. 2. In Sect. 4, we propose algorithms for all other relevant situations, i.e., public-base and private-exponent, private-base and public-exponent and private-base and private-exponent, and simultaneous modular exponentiations. Section 5 gives the complexity of our algorithms and compares the efficiency of the algorithms with the prior works. In Sect. 6, we apply our algorithms to oblivious transfer protocols and to blind signa-tures. Section 7 concludes the paper with highlighting future research directions on outsourcing cryptographic computations.
Security and privacy model
In this work, we follow the security model proposed by Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [3] like the recent results in [2, 5] . Assume that a client C would like to securely outsource an expensive cryptographic computation Alg to a cloud server S. Our aim is to split the computation into two main procedures (1) C knows the input value to Alg, and (2) C invokes S which is an untrusted server that can carry out expensive computation operations. Briefly, C securely outsources some computation if the following conditions hold:
1. C and S implement Alg, i.e., Alg = C S 2. Assume that C has oracle access to an adversary S (instead of an honest S) which stores its computational results during each run and behaves maliciously in order to learn extra information. S is not able to retrieve any valuable information about the input-output pair of C S .
We are now ready to give the formal model for secure outsourced cryptographic algorithms, which is based on principally the model of [3] . Definition 1 [3] (Algorithm with outsource-I/O) An algorithm Alg obeys the outsource input/output specification if it takes five inputs, and produces three outputs. The first three inputs are generated by an honest party and are classified by how much the adversary A = (E, S ) knows about them, where E is the adversarial environment that submits maliciously chosen inputs to Alg, and S is the adversarial software operating in place of oracle S.
1. First is the honest secret input, which is unknown to both E and S , 2. Second is the honest protected input, which may be known by E, but is protected from S , 3. Third is the honest unprotected input, which may be known by both E and S, 4. Fourth is the adversarial protected input which is known to E, but protected from S , 5. Fifth is the adversarial unprotected input, which may be known by E and S, 6. First is the secret input which is unknown to both E and S , 7. Second is the protected input which may be known to E, but not S , 8. Third is the unprotected input which may be known by both parties of A.
Outsource security means that if a malicious S can obtain some information about the secret of C S by playing the role of C instead of S, then S can also obtain it without following this procedure. More concretely, when C S (x) is queried, a simulator Sim S is constructed in such a way that without the knowledge of the secret or protected inputs of x, the view of S can be simulated. In the following outsource-security definition, it is guaranteed that the malicious environment E cannot learn any valuable information about the secret inputs and outputs of C S (even in the case that C runs the malicious software S developed by E). Correctness: C S is a correct implementation of Alg. Security: For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (E, S ), there exist probabilistic expected polynomial-time simulators (Sim E , Sim S ) such that the following pairs of random variables are computationally indistinguishable.
-Pair One. EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal -The real process: In doing so, it is allowed to query oracle S ; moreover, S saves its state as in the real experiment.
-Pair Two. EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal -The view that the untrusted software S obtains by participating in the real process described in Pair One.
In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator Sim S who, equipped with only the unprotected inputs (x i hu , x i au ), queries S . As before, S may maintain state.
Definition 3 [3] (α-efficient, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms (C, S) is said to be an α-efficient implementation of Alg if 1. C S is a correct implementation of Alg and 2. ∀ inputs x, the running time of C is no more than an α-multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg.
Definition 4 [3] (β-checkable, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms (C, S) is said to be an β-checkable implementation of Alg if 1. C S is a correct implementation of Alg and 2. ∀ inputs x, if S deviates from its advertised functionality during the execution of C S (x), C will detect the error with probability no less than β.
Definition 5 [3] ((α, β)-outsource security) A pair of algorithms (C, S) is said to be an (α, β)-outsource-secure implementation of Alg if it is both α-efficient and β-checkable.
3 Main algorithm for modular exponentiation (private-base and private-exponent)
Preliminaries
There are basically two different settings for which modular exponentiations are the most expensive parts of the cryptographic computation: the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the RSA problem. In both cases, we summarize the following conditions to obtain mathematical problem instances which are intractable enough to obtain the desired level of security for the corresponding cryptographic schemes.
DLP case
Let p and q be prime numbers and G ⊆ F * p be a subgroup generated by a primitive element g of order q. In order to have an intractable DLP on G, we impose the usual conditions on the number of distinct cosets in F * p /G being comparably small, i.e., we have a small cofactor c = p−1 q (since otherwise by Chinese remainder theorem (Pohlig-Hellman reduction), the complexity of DLP reduces to much smaller groups leading to less secure group-based cryptographic systems [36] ). This means that we need to hide the exponent of the exponentiation but not necessarily the base for the security of the encryption algorithms. On the other hand, hiding the base element in the modular exponentiation realizes the privacy-preserved applications.
We restrict ourselves to the multiplicative subgroup of prime field case G ≤ F * p , although it is also possible to use prime-order multiplicative subgroups of the extension fields of F p . The main reason of our restriction is that the recent quasi-polynomial attacks on DLP of certain extension fields of small characteristics suggest not to use nonprime finite fields in cryptographic setting [37] . We note that all secure outsourcing algorithms for modular exponentiation (including the algorithms proposed in this paper) can easily be adapted to secure outsourcing algorithms for scalar multiplication of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) by using a prime-order subgroup of E(F p ) instead of the group G. Using these algorithms for scalar multiplications of elliptic curves, one can also obtain hybrid privacy-preserving outsourcing algorithms for pairing-based cryptosystems by means of outsourcing private inputs of pairing functions, bilinearity property and private exponentiations in finite fields for the realization of ID-based cryptography [36] .
RSA case
In this case, we have the modulus n = p · q, where p and q are distinct large prime numbers. Since RSA-based systems rely on the arithmetic of G := (Z/nZ) * , we have an exponent ranging 0 to ( p − 1)(q − 1) − 1. For public key encryptions, the message must be private, but the public key can be disclosed to the server (similarly, for the signatures, only the private key is kept private). However, similar to the DLP case, hiding exponents or base elements in the modular exponentiations enable to obtain privacy-preserving outsourced schemes. Constructing such a system makes impossible for the server to distinguish between encryption/decryption/signature/verification processes which can be an important design criteria for privacy-preserving infrastructures (e.g., attribute-based encryption schemes). To the best of our knowledge, there is only one algorithm proposed for RSA-based modular exponentiation [22] , for which the checkability fails as explained in Sect. 1.1. Hence, our algorithm unifies modular exponentiation modulo a prime or a composite number for the first time.
For real-life applications, the group order m is typically chosen as a 2048-bit number for RSA-or DLP-based systems and as a 384-bit number for ECC-based systems.
The main algorithm
In this section, we propose our main algorithm for modular exponentiation modulo n with the underlying group G, which is either the subgroup of F * n or (Z/nZ) * of order m. Note that n can be either a prime number or an RSA modulus covering the both cases as described above.
Client is willing to compute u a mod n privately, where u ∈ G and a ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} private inputs and n is public. More precisely, the algorithm has inputs u, a and n and outputs u a mod n without explicitly giving the values of u, a and u a to the server.
Let now the blinding factors
) ∈ Z/mZ×G 2 and (y, g y ), (s, g s ) ∈ Z/mZ× G be given. Note that except g −t 1 and g −t 2 , these values can be computed using a Rand Algorithm as defined in [3] . For taking the inverse of g t 1 and g t 2 , one can either extend the Rand algorithm or they can be computed offline. Similarly, in the case of RSA setting, all these values can be computed by extending the Rand algorithm or by computing them offline. Furthermore, these values are stored on the client side, and one can argue that this is dangerous for the RSA setting if the client is a lower-power device because low-power devices are not generally temper-resistant. However, these values are stored in the same protected area as all other private keys and any attack to the values can also apply to the private keys.
Note that these blinding factors are precomputed in order to speed up computations [2, 3] . The values x, y, t 1 and t 2 can be used several times for different exponents, whereas the value s should be used only once.
Furthermore, we abbreviate by C the client and by S the server. We have also the assumption that C can run an algorithm to query u a to S. We denote the output of such a query by Exp(a, u). Before we explain our main algorithm, we propose the following subalgorithm SubAlg for outsourcing g z , where g is a generator of the group G and z is a random group element. Note that g and z are not necessarily private for SubAlg, and it is only crucial to check the correctness of the result g z . The client C has inputs g, z and c, where c is a checkability parameter.
During the precomputation phase, the Rand algorithm
. . , c} ⊆ Z/mZ, and sends these values to C. At the first phase, C picks random elements c −1
and 1 because these values are masked before they are sent to S and they are never revealed to S.
We would like to emphasize that c is chosen to be a very small positive integer. For example, if c=4 then the checkability becomes 11/12 that is already sufficient to be able to compare with the existing schemes. In particular, since c 1 and c 2 are very small integers, the values Z 
.
= g s and returns Z 
Theorem 1 SubAlg terminates and outputs correctly with probability
Proof The termination simply follows from the algorithm specification. Namely, C outsources the computations
and obtains Z 1 and Z 2 , respectively. If S does not respond within specific time interval C aborts and outputs fail. Otherwise, C verifies and outputs the result. More precisely, C first computes
2 , where c −1
2 . Finally, C computes and verifies the following result.
If the equality does not hold, then algorithm outputs checkability failure. Finally, C outputs
To prove that a malicious S cannot maliciously behave without being detected with probability = g s . Since c 1 , c 2 and g s are unknown to S, the only way for S to be successful is to guess c 1 and c 2 correctly. Note that the probability of guessing the correct value of c 1 is 1/c, and once c 1 is chosen we have the probability 1/(c − 1) for guessing the correct value of c 2 . Hence, the overall probability becomes We now propose our main algorithm Algorithm 1 (Alg pr pr ) for private-base and private-exponent. For completeness, we introduce the following notation: Let a finite set M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } be given. We denote by S n (M) the group of permutations on M. Note that we can identify any permutation on S n (M) with a permutation on S n ({1, . . . , n}). By abuse of notation, we will write σ (
. , n}).
Before we go into the details, we give a brief summary of Alg pr pr as follows. The client C first masks the base u and the exponent a, respectively, and sends them to the server in a special form (based on the precomputed values). The server applies the algorithm specifications and returns the masked results. The client then removes the masks and verifies the correctness of the result. More precisely, for the goal of computing u a , we first precompute v = g x , w = ug −x , μ = g y , Z = g ax−y , where x and y are randomly chosen. Then u a is converted into (vw) a = g xa w a = μg z w a = μZ w a such that w = uv −1 , z = ax − y, where v, w, Z look random and are independent of u and a in the view of the attacker. Therefore, the algorithm has basically three computations in order to compute u a , i.e., μ, Z and w a .
-The first value μ = g y is already precomputed and stored. -The second value Z = g z is computed via the subalgorithm SubAlg for computing a modular exponentiation for a generator g and an exponent z = ax − y. We highlight that this subalgorithm only assures the correctness of the result rather than hiding the base g and the exponent z. Note that z is already masked with x, and y therefore does not leak any information to S. -Finally, w a is outsourced securely which is the longest and the most complicated part. This value is outsourced by first dividing the private-exponent a and a random
value r into k and subcomponents such that a = 
. . , c} (the aim of this condition is to assure the checkability property of Alg pr pr ),
Note that the elements of R are used to randomize the privateexponent a.
-C chooses a random permutation σ ∈ R S +k (U ) and sets the permuted elements U = σ (U ) := (σ 1 , . . . , σ k+ ). -Note that we use a temporary value temp in our main algorithm for the following reason: First observe that the following values are computed during the main algorithm:
• U ∓ 's are computed for the sets
Since the sets R, S, T have common and disjoint values, temp is used to minimize modular multiplications by distributing the elements into these sets. Note that temp is not used
After assigning U ∓ to T ∓ temp will be used to compute the final T ∓ .
• In the second round, because U 2 = U ∩ R ∩ S.
After assigning U ∓ to S ∓ temp will be used to compute the final S ∓ .
• In the third round, because U 3 = R ⊂ U . -Let U := {u 1 , . . . , u k+ }. C chooses a random permutation σ ∈ R S +k (U ) and sets the permuted elements U = σ (U ) := (σ 1 , . . ., σ k+ ) . The permutation σ basically mixes the subcomponents of a and r to ensure the privacy of the exponent a. Moreover, the invocations take place with signed values of the subcomponents using
-After S returns the computed values, C basically computes w a+r , w r , w s and w t and verifies the correctness of the result w a by checking s + c 1 t = c 2 in the exponents. -If the verification is successful, C outputs w a by removing w r from w a+r .
-C finally returns the expected outcome u a by computing μZ w a .
We give a toy example in Sect. 3.2.2 for better understanding of the algorithm. The algorithm is now given as follows. 
4. C chooses a random permutation σ ∈ R S +k (U ) and sets the permuted elements U = σ (U ) := (σ 1 , . . . , σ k+ ).
5. C sets U − , U + ← 1 and uses the partitions in Fig. 1 . Furthermore, C runs and computes in random order for j ∈ {1, . . . , k + } (U − , U + are negative/positive parts of the exponents of U )
(This is the expected outcome u a )
Correctness and termination
Theorem 2 Alg pr pr terminates and outputs correctly. Proof Precomputation and step 1 of Alg pr pr imply that u a = (vw) a = g xa w a = μg z w a = μZ w a , where w = uv −1 and z = ax − y.
) denote the sum of the negatively (resp. positively) signed part of the elements of U i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. In step 7 part (a) with using the query results of S, C computes the negative part w u 
The output will be assigned to the negative part T − and the positive part T + in the exponent the elements of T . Analogously, C computes in steps (b) and (c) the corresponding negative parts and the positive parts and assigns the output to the exponent elements of the contributed sets.
Different from the steps (a), (b) and (c), C computes in step (d) the negative part w u 
The output will be multiplied in this case with the negative parts U − , T − and the positive parts U + , T + in the exponent elements of U and T . Analogously, C computes w 
Using the definition of t, we obtain also
Together with steps (a) to (g) and step (h), we obtain
If the equality does not hold, then the checkability fails. If S runs the query algorithm properly, then the algorithm ends with step 7 as follows:
A toy example
We illustrate with a toy example our main algorithm Alg pr pr for better understanding. Note that this example is just to explain our algorithm in a simple setting. For real-life applications, the group size should be at least 1024 bit for DLP or RSA and 160 bit for the elliptic curve DLP. In particular, the computational advantage of our algorithms increases with the key sizes (see Sect. 5). Let p = 103 be given with the primitive element g = 3. Hence, G =< 3 > with |G| = p − 1 = 102. Hence, we have 37 72 = μ · Z · 61 72 = 95 · 10 · 61 72 . We now need to outsource 61 72 securely. Since k = = 4, we have 8 nonempty sets that we choose randomly with the conditions of steps 2, 3, 4 and 5.
We now choose α = (10011010) as in step 4. Then, the signed U becomes U Signed = {−u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , −u 4 , −u 5 , u 6 , −u 7 , u 8 }. Let also s = u 1 + u 2 + u 6 + u 7 = 13 + 79 + 42 + 57 ≡ 89 mod 102 and t ≡ −u 1 − u 4 Step 9 finally computes the outcome as follows: U − ≡ w −u 1 ·w −u 4 ·w −u 5 ·w −u 7 ≡ 66·79·72·100 ≡ 81 mod 103. Similarly, U + ≡ w u 2 ·w u 3 ·w u 6 ·w u 8 ≡ 100·13·30·81 ≡ 93 mod 103.
The final outcome is u a ≡ 76 mod 103.
Security and checkability
In this part, we give the security analysis of Alg pr pr and show that a malicious server cannot be able to get any valuable information about u and a.
The next lemma gives the probability that a malicious server obtains the exponent.
Lemma 1 A malicious server S learns the exponent a with probability at most
Proof The output will only be disclosed if S obtains exactly the same position of a i 's with their signs. Hence, the probability of this event is 1/ 2k k · 2 k . Hence, S cannot distinguish the two test queries from all of the 2k queries that C makes, and during any execution of Alg pr pr , the server S can successfully cheat without being detected with probability at most √ π k 2 3k by using the Stirling's approximation [38] . Note that letting k = = 29, the probability becomes negligible (≈ 2 −80 ).
We are now ready to prove the security of Alg pr pr . As explained above, outsource security informally means that there exists a simulator which simulates the view of the adversary in a real algorithm run. This means that the adversary obtains no relevant information from the real run since it could output any result from what it knows by itself. Proof We note that this proof is inspired from the proof of the security analysis of [3] . Let A = (E, S ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary interacting with a PPT-based algorithm C in the outsource-security model.
Firstly, we prove EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal . (Pair Onethe external adversary E learns nothing.)
Let (a, u) be a private input of an honest party. Assume that Sim E is a PPT simulator which acts as follows. Sim E ignores the ith round when getting input, like using Fig. 1 it chooses random sets R := U 1 ∪U 2 ∪U 3 ∪U 4 := {r 1 , . . . , r } and (α 1 , . . . , α +k ) = (σ 1 , . . . , σ k+ ) . Sim E sets U − , U + ← 1 and uses the partitions in Fig. 1 .
If an error occurs, Sim E stores its own and S 's states and outputs gives an incorrect output in the ith round, then the output will be detected by C and Sim E with probability at most √ π k 2 3k due to Lemma 1, resulting in an output of "err or ; otherwise, the software will indeed be successful in manipulating the output of Alg pr pr (e.g., because each request is independent of each other, sending approximately 29 wrong results with their signs to the client C makes the probability of not being detected to negligibly small (≈ 1/2 80 ).).
In the real execution, the k + real outputs of S are firstly grouped into two different parts corresponding to their signs (positive or negative). The negative and positive parts will be independently computed due to the checkability condition s + c 1 t = c 2 . The result will be multiplied corresponding to their signs (7 and 8 of Alg pr pr ). At the last step, we multiply the overall result with the masking values of the base element generated at the first step according to their signs. Hence, a manipulated output of Alg pr pr will seem to be wrong, but random to E.
We simulate this situation in the ideal execution by replacing the output of Alg pr pr with a random element in G when there is an attempt to behave maliciously by S which would not be detected by C in the real execution. Hence, even if S behaves maliciously in the ith round, EVIEW i real ∼ EVIEW i ideal . By the hybrid argument, we can easily conclude that EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal .
Next, we prove EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal . (Pair Twothe untrusted server S obtains no useful information.)
We now consider the cases where (a, u) is honest secret/protected or adversarial protected. Let Sim S be a PPT simulator that acts in the following manner. Sim S ignores the ith round when getting input and instead chooses a permutation σ ∈ S +k and prepares a signed permuted random query of the form ((−1) α σ ( j) σ j ) ∈ Z/mZ × G to S using α σ ( j) , where j ∈ {1, . . . , k + }. Sim E randomly checks (k + ) outputs from each procedure using σ . Then, Sim S stores its own and states of S . Note that these real and ideal executions are distinguishable by E, but E cannot use this information to S (e.g., the output of the ideal execution is never manipulated). During the ith round of the real execution, the inputs of C) are always randomized to 2(k + ) utilizing σ, α (see steps 6 and 7 of Alg pr pr ). In the ideal execution, Sim S always generates independently random queries for S . The view is consistent and indistinguishable from the server's view when there is an interaction with honest C. Thus, for each round, we have EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal , which by the hybrid argument yields EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal .
Consequently, we simulate every step of Alg pr pr for the simulator which completes the simulation for both malicious environment and server. Proof We use the same approach of the proof of the algorithm in [3] . The algorithm SubAlg makes 3 calls to Rand and 4 log c + 8 modular multiplications. The proposed algorithm Alg pr pr makes 2 further calls to Rand and together with SubAlg, k + + 4 log c + 30 modular multiplications (MMs) and only 1 modular inversion (MInv) in order to compute u a mod n (other operations like modular additions, doubling or multiplication with very small numbers like c are omitted). Also, a server-aided exponentiation takes O(log 2 (l)) MMs using the number theoretic complexity analysis of Nguyen, Shparlinski and Stern [14] , or O(1) MMs if a table-lookup method is used. On the other hand, it takes in average 1.5l MMs to compute u a mod n by the classical square-and-multiply method. Thus, the algorithm (C, S) is an O(log 2 l/l)-efficient implementation of Alg pr pr . For the second case, finding either the exact value of a or r has negligibly probability (see Lemma 1) .
Lemma 2 The algorithm (C, S) is an O(log

Lemma 3 The algorithm (C, S) is an (1−
For the third case, to be able to find the correct values of s, the server S first needs to find out the subset S from the power set P(U ) such that s= k i=1 s i . The value t can subsequently be obtained by solving the subset sum problem for s + c 1 t = c 2 , where c 1 and c 2 are small integers. Similarly, one can start with t to find s. The complexity of finding such (s, t) pairs from the power set P(U ) is 2 k+ · 2 (k+ )/2 = 2 3/2(k+ ) (note that |P(U )| = 2 k+ ). The reason is that the best generic algorithms to solve the subset sum problem are lattice-based methods which require 2 n/2 for any set of cardinality n [11, [39] [40] [41] [42] .
For the last two cases, S can attack the checkability of the system if it can find a value s i (or t i ) with its sign. Namely, the checkability follows from 2 and with the knowledge of s i (or t i ) and its sign and the knowledge of c 1 and c 2 . Finding a value s i has probability at least 1/2 and with probability at least 1/2 to decide whether it has negative or positive sign. Therefore, the overall probability of this event is 1 4c 2 . Hence, the overall probability for a malicious server S to declare a incorrect value without being detected is
. Now the security and the checkability of Alg pr pr follow obviously from the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The algorithm (C, S) is an (O(log
Remark 1 Letting c = 4 gives us the probability 11/12 by Lemma 3 which is the best checkability result compared to previous works [2] [3] [4] [5] .
Note that in outsourced computation model, the malicious server S can be seen as a covert adversary [43] , which may arbitrarily behave to cheat depending on whether being detected with reasonable probability (not necessarily with very high probability) by an honest party. In [43] , covert adversaries are described for many real-life scenarios where they are always eager to cheat but only if they are not detected. Therefore, cloud servers can be seen as covert adversaries in outsourced computation setting because their financial interests and their reputation deter them from cheating.
Other relevant algorithms
In this section, we simplify Alg pr pr for public-base and privateexponent and private-base and public-exponent cases and modify it to obtain a more efficient simultaneous modular exponentiations algorithm.
Public-base and private-exponent
In this part, we modify Alg pr pr for the case of public-base and private-exponent. The modified method is especially designed to outsource the cryptographic outsourced computation for the cases in which there is no need to hide the base element if it is not required in the cryptographic setting (e.g., signatures). The first precomputation of Alg 
Private-base and public-exponent
In this part, we give another algorithm for private-base and public-exponent cryptographic computation by modifying Alg pr pr . Note that in particular, for public key encryption or signature verification-based systems, it could be desirable to have private-base and public-exponent. This algorithm is denoted by Alg pb pr which works in detail as follows. 3. For verification, C does the following computations: 
where b 1 , b 2 ∈ R {1, −1}, c 1 , c 2 ∈ R I and gcd(c 1 , c 2 ) = 1. At step 2, S returns the query results
and
Then C computes the following to verify the result. C first removes the masking values t 1 and t 2 using c 3 and c 4 as
Next, the masking values from U 1 and U 2 will be removed, i.e., U 1 = u ac 1 
= (U 2 ) c 1 , where c 1 , c 2 ∈ I and k = c 1 · c 2 . If the equality does not hold, then algorithm outputs checkability failure. Finally, because gcd(c 1 , c 2 ) = 1 and c 1 , c 2 are very small, C efficiently computes u a .
A malicious server cannot learn the private-base u because it is randomized with g s 1 and g s 2 . Furthermore, a malicious server cannot also change the outcome unless it finds either c 1 , c 2 or c 3 , c 4 and the probability of this event is 1 − 1 c(c−1) .
t-simultaneous modular exponentiations
We now generalize the notion of simultaneous modular exponentiation method of [2] to the notion of t-simultaneous modular exponentiations u a 1 1 . . . u a t t in the group G for t ∈ N. t-simultaneous modular exponentiations are extensively used in many real-life cryptographic schemes including [19, 35, [44] [45] [46] [47] . As described in [2] , computing 2-simultaneous modular exponentiations is trivial by simply invoking Alg pr pr twice. Here, we show that it is possible to reduce the computation cost significantly for a generalized t-simultaneous setting by improving the method of [2] and utilizing only one untrusted server (instead of two noncolluding malicious servers). We denote by t-Sim-Alg pr pr for t-simultaneous modular exponentiation algorithm.
The scheme of Chen et al. [2] has probability 2/3 for checkability in modular exponentiation utilizing and has probability 1/2 for 2-Sim-Alg pr pr using two noncolluding servers. They simply add a one more variable on the exponentiation at the expense of reducing the probability from 2/3 to 1/2. Our solution has a scalable probability 1 − 1 c(c−1) for checkability and utilizes only one single untrusted server.
We further emphasize that the natural generalization for 2-simultaneous modular exponentiation method in [2] reduces the checkability probability from 1 2 of single exponentiation case to 2 t+2 for t-simultaneous modular exponentiations. However, the use of t-simultaneous modular exponentiation in real-life protocols, like anonymous credentials [35] , causes significant complexity overhead. Hence, this reduction hinders the use of this generalization from 2-simultaneous to t-simultaneous modular exponentiation. Unlike the scheme in [2] , our scheme has an adjustable probability 1 − 
Note that w i 's are completely random and, therefore, can be revealed to S. Hence, instead of invoking Alg pr pr t times, it is now possible to invoke more efficient algorithm Alg pr pb t times. In particular, we gain a linear factor for the number of total multiplication in the number t. More precisely, a t-simultaneous modular exponentiation requires t ( + k + 4 log c + 28) + 10 + 4 log c modular multiplications and t modular inversions instead of invoking Alg pr pr t-times which requires t ( + k + 8 log c + 38) modular multiplications and t modular inversions. Hence, we save 10t +4 log ct modular multiplications by using our t-simultaneous modular exponentiation technique.
For instance, the complexity of 2-simultaneous modular exponentiations running 2-Sim-Alg 
Complexity analysis of the proposed algorithms
In this section, we first illustrate the complexity of our proposed algorithms using Table 1 . In this table, we give the complexity results by counting the number of modular exponentiations for the server side and for the client side the number of modular multiplications (MMs), the number of modular inversions (MInvs), the number of Rands and checkability probabilities. Note that we count the number of multiplication in the worst case by using classical double and algorithm, i.e., for an l−bit exponent we require 2l +1 MMs. In Table 2 , we give the complexity of the proposed algorithms by setting = k = 29 and c = 4. We note that by Lemma 3, letting = k = 29 reduces the probability of privacy leakage to negligible levels.
In order to compare Alg pr pr with the previous results properly, we need to equate the checkability probabilities of all algorithms and count the number of all operations in terms of modular multiplications. For this purpose, we use the fact that in a real-life hardware setting, a modular inversion is about 100 times slower than a modular multiplication [48] . In order to have the same checkability probability 11/12, we have to run the algorithm [3] log 2 12 ≈ 3, 58 times and the algorithm [2] log 3 12 ≈ 2, 26 times. The comparison will now be as follows:
In [3] , we have 9 MMs and 5 MInvs in one round. Hence, in log 2 12 rounds, we obtain 9 · log 2 12 MMs and 5 · log 2 12 MInvs. Hence, we have a total number of 9 · log 2 12 + 100 · 5 · log 2 12 ≈ 1825 MMs for [3] .
In [2] , we have 7 MMs and 3 MInvs in one round. Hence, in log 3 12 rounds, we obtain 7 · log 3 12 MMs and 3 · log 3 12 MInvs. Hence, we have a total number of 7 · log 3 12 + 100 · 3 · log 3 12 ≈ 694 MMs for [2] .
In [5] , the goal is to outsource u a , where c = a − bξ with b and c are known by the server with probability 1/6. Therefore, ξ must be large enough to prevent the brute-force attack. Hence, to have a negligible level, one has to choose ξ ≈ 2 77 . There are 167 MMs and 4 MInvs for the checkability of 1/2. Hence, in log 2 12 rounds, we obtain 167 · log 2 12 MMs and 4 · log 2 12 MInvs. Hence, we have a total number of 167 · log 2 12 + 100 · 4 · log 2 12 MMs for [5] .
The algorithm Alg pr pr has 100 MMs and only 1 MInv. Hence, there is a total number of approximately 100 + 1 · 100 = 200 MMs.
In Table 3 , we compare our algorithm Alg pr pb with the results of [2, 3] and [5] . In the last column of Table 3 , we give the total number of MMs which shows that our algorithm Alg pr pb is the most efficient algorithm using only one single untrusted server S with the best checkability.
Remark 2 Although the number of MMs of Alg pr pr is slightly better than the number of MMs in the algorithm of [2] for only one outsourced modular exponentiation, using t-Sim- Furthermore, Alg pr pr has better checkability probability (11/12 vs. 2/3). We highlight that our checkability probability increases with the value of c at the expense of increasing the number of modular multiplication logarithmically. In particular, our approach enables the designer to obtain privacy-preserving outsourcing algorithms with scalable checkability.
Memory complexity is also an important criteria, especially for resource-constrained devices. The schemes [3] and [2] , which use two noncolluding servers, need to store 22 and 17 group elements, respectively. In [5] , which uses only one single untrusted server, 6k + 5 + 16 group elements are stored, where r, s are security parameters. By equating the checkability to 11/12 in all these schemes [2, 3, 5] , the required memory becomes 22 · log 2 12 ≈ 78.87, 17 · log 3 12 ≈ 38.45 and 6k + 5 + 16 · log 2 12, respectively. Our main algorithm only stores k + + c + 27 group elements, where k, are security parameters and c is a small integer. When compared to the only existing scheme using one untrusted server [5] , we gain a linear factor in for the memory requirement.
We remark that one demerit of Algorithm 1 (Alg [2] require log 3 12 · (6 log m + 12·g), and [5] requires log 2 12·4(log m +8·g) bits of transmission. Our main algorithm transmits (k + + 2) · log m +(k + +2)·g group elements to the server. We remark that the communication overhead of our algorithm for k = = 29 (for security with negligible error probability) is just slightly larger than the others. In particular, this disadvantage is not noticeable from the practical point of view with the current computational power.
6 Applications: outsourced oblivious transfer and blind signatures
Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer is a powerful cryptographic primitive which is complete for secure multiparty computation [27, 28] .
In an OT protocol, the sender has two private input bits (s 0 , s 1 ) and the chooser has one private input bit b. At the end of the protocol, the chooser learns only the bit s b , whereas the sender does not know any information which bit was selected by the chooser. With the help of cloud providers, it is possible to compute independently any outsourced functionality without disclosing the private input. Namely, clients only need to randomize/encrypt their data and de-randomize/decrypt the returned messages to get the desired results. OT is one of the major computational overheads for Yao's garbled circuit protocol [23, 29] and used in several applications like biometric authentication, e-auctions, private information retrieval and private search [30] [31] [32] [33] . Hence, running OT protocols for resource-constrained mobile environment may have substantial benefits.
In this section, we provide an example of outsourcing an OT protocol in a discrete log setting (see Fig. 2 ). Assume that G is a group generated by g (i.e., G =< g >) and h ∈ G, where log g h is unknown to any party. At the first step, the chooser chooses random r ∈ R G and invokes the cloud server S to compute Alg 1 ), respectively. Depending on his bit b, the chooser is able to decrypt one of these encryptions to learn either s 0 or s 1 . Hence, if both parties follow the protocol specification, the chooser learns exactly one of the bits s 0 and s 1 , and the sender does not know any information about what the chooser learns. The OT protocol used for outsourcing is secure in the semi-honest model, but malicious versions of OT can be used analogously. We finally would like to highlight that in the original OT protocol, for each input bit, the chooser computes 2 exponentiations, and the server computes 2 exponentiations and 2 simultaneous exponentiations. Therefore, our outsourcing algorithm gains higher computational efficiency in case the private inputs are longer. See Table 4 for the comparison of the standard OT protocol with the outsourced version.
Blind signatures
Blind signatures have been suggested by Chaum [34] . Roughly speaking, it allows a signer interactively issue signatures and allows users to obtain them such that the signer sees neither the resulting message nor the signature pair during the signing session. Like any conventional electronic signatures, they are unforgeable and can be verified using a public key. Blind signatures can be applied to privacy-preserving protocols like e-cash, e-voting and anonymous credentials. For a e-cash scenario, a bank blindly signs coins withdrawn by the users. For an e-voting scenario, an authority blindly signs a vote for later to cast the signed votes. As for anonymous credentials which especially needs simultaneous exponentiations with expensive zero-knowledge proofs, the issuing authority blindly signs a key [35] for later to authenticate services anonymously. We would like to highlight that in the original blind signature protocol, the signer and the verifier compute exponentiation using private and public keys, respectively. Hence, for mobile environment and constrained devices, outsourcing blind signatures gains higher computational efficiency and therefore can be beneficial for real-life applications (see Fig. 3 ). See Table 4 for the comparison of the standard OT protocol with the outsourced version.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose new, scalable, secure and efficient algorithms for outsourcing modular exponentiations (i.e., public-base and private-exponent, private-base and publicexponent, private-base and private-exponent, and simultaneous modular exponentiations). Our algorithms are significantly more efficient than the previous algorithms. Moreover, the proposed algorithms are modeled, where only one single untrusted cloud server exists. Our algorithms also enjoy the predetermined checkability property which is a significant improvement compared to the prior works. The security of our algorithms is proven formally based on the model of [3] . We finally utilize our algorithms for outsourcing oblivious transfer protocols and blind signatures, which may be beneficial for resource-constrained mobile secure environments running on a client.
The algorithm for single server in [5] requires extremely large number of MMs, whereas our algorithm needs comparably very small number of MMs (≈ 10, 17 times less MMs). On the other hand, although the communication round of our algorithm is constant, the overhead of information exchange is still large. Therefore, it is an interesting open problem to find better constructions achieving smaller (possibly constant) communication overhead together with smaller number of modular multiplications without any modular inversions.
